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Abstract— We propose a compact architecture based on fully
convolutional neural networks (FCN) to detect manipulated
images of human faces. In contrast to existing FCN architec-
tures for classification, here the final layer feature map exhibits
large spatial dimensions with non-global receptive field. The
final layer features are spatially averaged using global average
pooling (GAP) to provide more robust features. We leverage the
structure of the FCN to derive a straightforward way for joint
classification and forgery localization training and show that
the network’s classification performance improves significantly
by the addition of a pixelwise classification loss. The trained
networks achieve state of the art results in binary classification
in the FaceForensics++ dataset and competitive performance in
other tasks using a significantly reduced number of parameters
and small resolution input images. Additionally, we examine
how well the proposed architecture can detect fully generated
images using faces from the recently proposed PGAN and
StyleGAN methods. We show that this task is easier to learn
than detecting manipulated images and that for both cases there
is only a small drop of performance when the network is trained
using more than one manipulation technique in the training
data.
I. INTRODUCTION
Image manipulation software, e.g. Adobe Photoshop,
GIMP has made images unreliable as a source of evidence.
While photographs can be admissible in court, in case of
a dispute the burden of authentication falls to the party
introducing them into evidence [1]. Individuals share the
same intuition. After decades of exposure to manipulated
image content we do not think of images as self-evidently
portraying an accurate representation of reality and in most
cases an image will need to be authenticated before it can be
received as such. Up until recently, video content has been
thought of as a more reliable source of information, given
that realistic tampering required a considerable amount of
resources and in most cases could been easily identifiable
by experts.
This has changed with the rise of deep learning based
techniques for image generation and manipulation as well as
developments using computer vision based techniques. While
these techniques have the capacity to kickstart a revolution in
computer graphics and digital content creation, if misapplied
can definitely have applications of malevolent abuse and
severe negative impacts on human rights standards (e.g.
privacy, stigmatization, discrimination). Additionally, previ-
ously successful image forensics methods do not generalize
to the new techniques or to the artifacts produced during
strong video compression which is commonly applied when
a video is uploaded in social media platforms. Thus, it is
critical to develop tools that help the automatic authentication
of video content.
In this paper we propose a methodology for detecting ma-
nipulated images of faces in compressed videos. Our key
contributions are the following:
• we design a FCN [27] architecture specifically for the
task of detecting manipulated images. The trained mod-
els outperform all networks of similar size or smaller
in the FaceForensics++ dataset by a large margin on
all tasks and achieve > 95% accuracy in detecting
images generated from sate-of-the-art GANs under high
compression
• we show that adding a segmentation loss component and
jointly training for forgery classification-localization
improves model performance significantly over the base
case for all examined tasks. In doing so, we achieve
state-of-the-art results in the FaceForensics++ dataset
for manipulation specific training under medium com-
pression while having a twenty fold reduction over the
number of model parameters
• the suggested model uses input images of size 128×128,
significantly smaller than competing architectures. This
is of particular interest for detecting forgeries in a low
resolution setting, where model performance could be
reduced by upscaling images to fit input size.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Image Manipulation
In this context identity manipulation can be achieved by
replacing crops of a source and target face while ensuring
that the face orientation of the target matches that of the
source. FaceSwap uses facial landmarks to scale and align
such crops of source and target faces. A 3D face model is
fitted using the facial landmarks and blended with the source
image using alpha blending. Deepfakes employ a deep learn-
ing approach to face swapping by use of deep autoencoders
on individual face crops. The encoder part of the network is
shared between all identities in a dataset, a separate decoder
is trained for each identity. This forces the encoder to retain
information such as orientation and illumination while the
facial characteristics that constitute identity are modelled
entirely by the decoder. After training, in order to swap
faces the target video frames are passed through the common
encoder, followed by the decoder corresponding to the source
identity. Computer vision based techniques can also be used
to warp an image to produce a desired effect. Face2Face [36]
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is a system for facial reenactment that manipulates pixels
in a target video such that the facial expressions, pose and
illumination match those in a source video. The system only
requires monocular video and was the first one to achieve
high performance while used in real time.
Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) [14] were intro-
duced to model the data distribution of a training set and
produce new samples representative of that distribution. They
achieve this task by training two networks in parallel, a
generator network receives a fixed size random input and
produces an output matching the desired dimensions. A
discriminator network receives the output of the generator
as well as images from the training set. In each case the role
of the discriminator is to classify each image as real or gen-
erated and is trained by minimizing a classification loss. On
the other hand, the generator has the objective of maximizing
the discriminator’s loss resulting in a minimax optimization
problem. GANs were the first models to show promising
results in the field of image generation. Conditional GANs
[29] use labels to generate samples corresponding to a
specific category. The introduction of cycle consistency loss
[41], [20] enables training of models that can translate
between a source and target domain without the need for
paired examples. StarGAN [11] can perform image-to-image
translations for multiple domains using only a single model,
showing impressive results in altering the hair color, gender,
age, skin tone and emotion of human faces. PGANs [18]
gradually increase the resolution of generated images by
adding layers to the generator and discriminator, being the
first ones to achieve 1024x1024 pixel realistic images of
human faces. StyleGAN [19] takes inspiration from research
on style transfer [16] to propose a generator architecture
that can learn to discriminate between high level features
and stochastic variation e.g. in the context of human face
generation. StyleGAN uses the same principle of progressive
growing of generated images and is capable of producing
highly realistic human faces [3].
B. Image Manipulation Detection
Image forensics and steganalysis have a long history of
research in verification of the authenticity of image based
content. They focus on detecting a set of predefined ma-
nipulation artifacts that result from key image manipulation
operations such as copy-move [9], splicing [15], rescale [31]
and rotation [37] operations or application of median filters
[38] among others. These detectors generally work great
for the type of forgery they were designed for but their
use is limited by the large number of forgery operations a
comprehensive system should be able to detect. Additionally,
in the context of videos image forensics models have been
shown to deteriorate significantly in performance in the
presence of strong compression [34].
More recent literature includes many works using deep
learning methods to detect manipulated or generated image
content. CNNs trained end-to-end using stochastic gradient
descent have been shown to generally outperform other
approaches. However, it is common for researchers to draw
inspiration from forensics based techniques to introduce
useful structural priors to CNN architectures for detecting
manipulated content.
Inspired from steganalysis [10] propose a CNN input
layer specially designed to detect manipulation features by
learning a set of prediction error filters on image pixels while
suppressing information on image content. This is achieved
by constraining the convolutional kernel to have a central
value of −1 and all remaining values to sum to 1.0, enforcing
these constraints after each gradient descent update. The
resulting layer is forced to model the relationship between
pixels and their neighbourhood which is expected to differ
in manipulated regions irrespective of content.
The use of CNNs to distinguish between computer gen-
erated and real photographic images was explored in [32].
Their model includes a convolutional feature extractor and a
global pooling layer that calculates low order moments from
the CNN features that are passed to a classifier. Applying
this process on high resolution samples they split an image
into patches, calculate class probabilities for all patches and
propose a voting scheme to predict the image class.
Two compact CNN architectures for detecting Deepfakes
and Face2Face manipulated videos are presented in [7]. The
authors argue that the strong compression in videos will
degrade information in the low level features. Instead they
design the networks to focus on the mesoscopic properties
of images.
Results from training and testing various models provided
in literature ([32], [10], [7]) is presented in [34]. Additionally,
they train a version of the Xception network [12] starting
from pretrained ImageNet weights. They show that all meth-
ods achieve higher than 95% accuracy for uncompressed
images but performance drops greatly for medium and high
levels of compression apart from Xception that achieves
the best performace overall. The Xception model is further
adapted to use 128 × 128 image patches and perform pixel
wise forgery localization. As a benchmark for human per-
formance a human study is performed showing that current
computer based methods clearly outperform humans on the
task of detecting manipulated images of faces.
In [35] the availability of temporal information to de-
tect face tampering is explored using a model framework
common in video processing with deep neural networks and
training on the FaceForensics++ dataset. As a first step they
train a backbone CNN architecture (ResNet, DenseNet) on
single images. This is followed by training a temporal model
(bidirectional RNN) on CNN features and then training
the system end-to-end. For high compression a DenseNet
architecture achieves state of the art precision in binary clas-
sification for all classes trained with each class separately.
The intuition that the final image rescaling and align-
ment steps common in various deepfakes pipelines should
introduce face warping artifacts is further explored in [25]
who propose a self supervised technique for training deep
CNN to detect deepfakes without the need for expensive
negative examples. To do so they aim at simulating those
artifacts during training by the following steps: extract and
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Fig. 1. Data Preprocessing. (Left) Sample frame from FaceForensics++
dataset and face crop box in green, (Right) Close up to face region, original
crop box is shown in green as well as five facial landmarks, the final crop
is enclosed in red rectangle, the center of landmark locations is shown in
red cross
align face regions, introduce Gaussian blur smoothing to the
aligned face region and affine warp back to the size and
orientation of the initial image. Testing on the datasets from
[22], [39] their method appears to detect deepfakes with high
accuracy. In [24] the authors take advantage of a bias of
facial datasets not to include faces with their eyes closed.
As a result deepfakes techniques training on those datasets
tend to produce unrealistic blinking patterns which they use
to detect fake content. However, upon recognising that bias
it became easy for deepfakes techniques to produce realistic
blinking patterns by including pictures of people with their
eyes closed in training datasets. Observing that deepfakes
final steps of splicing the generated face to the target image
should introduce head pose inconsistencies [39] estimate 3D
poses of faces separately from landmarks for the central
region of the face and landmarks for the whole face and learn
a SVM classifier over differences of the pose estimates.
Placing emphasis on the need to protect against the negative
effects of manipulated video content of leaders [8] use fea-
tures derived from head pose and facial landmarks tracking
over time to model a person mannerisms while speaking.
Their models are able to predict fake content with high
accuracy even in high compression but are person specific
and thus capable of solving the problem only for specific
individuals.
The performance of several image forgery detectors is
examined in [28] for image-to-image translation methods
based on GANs. They show very good performance for all
models on uncompressed images which significantly drops
under the presence of compression especially with only deep
architectures achieving high test classification accuracy under
these conditions.
III. DATASETS
Most manipulation methods discussed is section II-B are
relatively new and constantly evolving. Given the inter
dependency of manipulation methods and forensics datasets
in a supervised learning setting and the large cost of training
models for image manipulation there has unsurprisingly been
a shortage of such datasets and benchmarks available.
The first publicly available dataset containing samples of
manipulated faces in videos used the VidTIMIT dataset [5]
which includes 10 videos for each one of the 43 partici-
pants. From those 32 participants were grouped in couples
according to physical similarities and a publicly available
implementation for Deepfakes [2] was used to produce 320
Deepfakes videos in two quality levels. [40] use publicly
available implemetations of FaceSwap techniques [23], [4]
to produce a dataset of 2010 manipulated images.
The FaceForensics dataset [33] includes a base of 1000
videos downloaded from YouTube [6]. All videos include
talking faces, mostly taken from news channels, in frontal
view without occlusions and of more than 300 consecutive
frames. This set is processed with the Face2Face [36]
algorithm to create a source-to-target reenactment dataset
by randomly choosing source and target videos and a self
reenactment dataset by applying Face2Face on the same
video. Three datasets are produced in each case for uncom-
pressed data and H.264 compressed data with quantization
parameters 23, 40 (low and high levels of compression). As
a byproduct of the manipulation method there are available
ground truth masks indicating the manipulated region which
can be used for forgery localization.
In all the manipulation detection experiments presented be-
low we use the FaceForensics++ dataset [34] which extends
FaceForensics to include samples generated from Deepfakes
[2] and FaceSwap [23] and is currently the largest available
forgery detection dataset. As in FaceForensics 1000 videos
are generated per manipulation method in the same com-
pression levels. To produce results that are comparable with
earlier studies we follow the same partition of the dataset
to 720 train, 140 evaluation and 140 test videos as in the
original paper.
Additionally, pretrained networks based on [18] and [19]
were used to generate images of faces. From each technique
70k faces were selected such that a face could be detected
using a reasonably high detection threshold and these were
split into 56k, 7k, 7k train, validation and test sets respec-
tively. For real images the Flickr-Faces-HQ (FFHQ) dataset
[19] of human faces was used. Since both networks were
trained with FFHQ it was thought that this dataset’s statistics
would differ as little as possible from the generated data and
would provide the fairest estimate of a model’s ability to
detect generated content. In total, the data used for generated
image detection consist of 210k images, 168k, 21k, 21k for
train, validation and test sets respectively. Even though these
images were not extracted from videos, in order to examine
the effect of compression on the detection performance all
images were compressed using H.264 coding at levels similar
to the ones used in the FaceForensics++ dataset.
IV. MANIPULATION DETECTION METHOD
A. Data Preprocessing
Incorporating prior knowledge into the data preprocessing
pipeline has been shown to improve the performance of
trained models [34]. For all the experiments that follow data
preprocessing involves cropping the faces from video frames
such that only the relevant information, ie. face region, is
seen by the model. We apply the following steps to extract
square face crops for all images data used in training and
evaluation:
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Fig. 2. Network Architecture. Layers L0 − L12 in gray represent feature tensors, convolution kernels are represented in blue. All dimensions can be
found in Table I.
1) a pretrained face detector b, l = D(x) [13] is used to
regress face box parameters b = [bx, by, dx, dy] (box
corner location and box dimensions) as well as five
landmark locations li = [lx,i, ly,i], i ∈ [1, 5] from an
input frame x
2) we derive the crop box side dcrop = 1.1dmax using
the largest side of the cropbox dmax = max(dx, dy)
3) we calculate the center of the five facial landmark
locations lm = 15
∑5
i=1 li
4) using dcrop we extract a square region centered at lm
and having an side of 2dcrop
5) in case the defined face region falls outside the image
dimensions we concatenate with zeros such that the
final shape is a square
6) the image is resized to the desired resolution
The process is shown in in Fig.1.
B. Model Architecture
In designing the model architecture presented below we
follow the intuition first presented in [7] that the required
signal for the classification problem at hand comes from
mesoscopic properties of images. Visual examination of
images in the datasets used does not offer sufficient clues
as to the authenticity of a face as there are many cases
of manipulated images which cannot be identified based on
appearance as well as real images which appear fake due to
compression artifacts. As such we do not expect macroscopic
appearance features to contain significant information for the
task of manipulation detection. In a human study conducted
in [34] humans were shown to be well inferior of most of
the models tested. On the other hand, microscopic features
should contain artifacts specific to the manipulation method
TABLE I
NETWORK ARCHITECTURE
Layer Input Layer Type Filters Output RF
0 - Input - 128x128x3 1
1 0 Conv2d 3x3, s1 126x126x32 3
2 1 Conv2d 3x3, s1 124x124x32 5
3 2 MaxPool2d 3x3, s2 61x61x32 9
4 3 Conv2d 3x3, s1 59x59x64 13
5 4 Conv2d 3x3, s1 57x57x64 17
6 5 Conv2d 3x3, s1 55x55x128 21
7 6 Conv2d 3x3, s1 53x53x128 25
8 7 Conv2d 3x3, s1 51x51x256 29
9 8 Conv2d 3x3, s1 49x49x256 33
10 9 Conv2d* 1x1, s1 49x49x2 33
11 9 AvPool2d 49x49 1x1x256 128
12 11 Conv2d* 1x1, s1 1x1x2 128
used, however, being local in nature we expected that infor-
mation to be corrupted under heavy video compression.
The proposed network architecture can be seen in Fig.I
with all relevant dimensions found in Table I. It consists
of a feature extactor with 8 convolutional and 1 MaxPool
layers (layers 1-9) and 2 separate classifiers (layers 10,
12) followed by SoftMax to derive class probabilities. All
convolution steps are followed by ReLU activation [30] and
Batch Normalization [17]. Convolutional filter strides are set
as 1 and MaxPool stride is 2 for downsampling. No padding
is used throughout the network.
The inspiration for the selected architecture comes from
the hypothesis that all patches of a given size and larger
should contain artifacts we can use to classify the image
as manipulated or not. In that respect we view FCNs as an
ensemble of CNNs on all image patches of size and stride
4
controlled by the network architecture. In that view, the GAP
operation assumes that all patches are expected to extract
features relevant to the authenticity of each patch which are
similar in nature and by taking the average of those values
we expect the final features to be more robust.
C. Loss Function
To further enforce the contribution from individual patches
we use a joint classification and segmentation objective
function. For the the segmentation task we use available
segmentation masks but do not employ deconvolution layers
to match input dimensions, instead we sub-sample the mask
at positions corresponding to the central pixels of each patch
as seen by the model. Assuming a CNN with receptive field
of drf × drf pixels at a stride s, an input image x ∈
RNin×Nin×3, an output features map o ∈ RNout×Nout×do ,
a one-hot segmentation mask m ∈ RNin×Nin × 2 and an
output class probabilities map yˆseg ∈ RNout×Nout×2 we
only use the central portion mc of m from (drf2 ,
drf
2 ) to
(Nin − drf2 , Nin − drf2 ) (top left, bottom right coordinates)
at stride s which has the same dimensions as yˆseg as labels.
The process of extracting labels for the segmentation task can
be seen in Fig.3. We use these to define an average Cross-
Entropy segmentation loss H over all spatial positions:
Lseg =
1
N2out
Nout∑
i=1
Nout∑
j=1
H(mcij , yˆ
seg
ij )
At the same time we apply GAP [26] over o to derive the
average output features om =
∑Nout
i=0
∑Nout
j=0 oij and a linear
layer followed by softmax to derive class probabilities for the
image yˆcls. Similarly, these are used to define a classification
Cross-Entropy loss using labels y:
Lcls = H(y, yˆcls)
The joint loss function for the model is defined using
hyperparameter λseg ≥ 0, λseg ≤ 1 as follows:
L = λsegLseg + (1− λseg)Lcls
In that the extreme values of λseg = 0 corresponds to training
only for the classification task while λseg = 1 corresponds
to segmentation only training.
D. Training and Evaluation
All networks were trained using the Adam optimizer
[21] with a learn rate of 10−3, an exponential learn rate
decay of 0.90 applied at the end of every epoch and L2
regularization with λ = 10−5. From the FaceForensics++
dataset we extracted one every five consecutive frames for
a total of 102k pristine images. All training consisted of 50
Fig. 3. Extracting mask for segmentation loss. (Left) Original segmentation
mask in white superimposed over manipulated image, extreme top-bottom,
left-right receptive field patches are shown in red, (Center) the central region
of used for the segmentation mask enclosed in green rectangle, (Right)
subsampled segmentation labels (stride 2) matching output dimensions used
in training
TABLE II
BINARY CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY - (TOP) MANIPULATION
METHOD-SPECIFIC TRAINING, (BOTTOM) TRAINING WITH ALL
MANIPULATION METHODS
C23 Compression C40 Compression
λseg DF F2F FS DF F2F FS
0.0 96.80 97.72 97.57 91.60 84.47 89.72
0.2 97.90 98.37 97.90 91.68 84.88 89.69
0.3 97.86 98.58 98.32 92.40 86.32 89.77
0.4 97.86 98.44 98.10 91.95 86.20 90.15
0.5 97.75 98.43 98.24 91.80 86.40 90.23
0.6 97.55 98.45 98.09 91.83 87.11 90.56
0.7 97.51 98.38 98.17 91.71 86.81 91.26
XceptionNet [34] 98.85 98.36 98.23 94.28 91.56 93.70
DenseNet [35] - - - 96.70 93.21 95.80
0.0 94.54 94.73 94.16 85.92 82.89 83.49
0.2 95.64 96.28 95.41 86.44 83.05 84.27
0.3 95.77 96.23 95.97 85.96 83.96 84.82
0.4 95.81 96.79 95.51 87.06 83.52 84.55
0.5 96.14 96.54 95.96 86.23 83.74 84.19
0.6 96.78 96.91 95.97 85.88 84.70 85.17
0.7 96.65 97.13 95.92 86.83 84.98 84.77
XceptionNet [34] 97.49 97.69 96.79 93.36 88.09 87.42
epochs, calculating the classification accuracy every 1000
train steps and keeping the model with the highest validation
classification accuracy overall. The test set is used for all
results presented below.
V. RESULTS
A. Image Manipulation Detection
Test classification accuracies per manipulation method can
be seen in Table II. Overall there is a noticeable performance
boost by the participation of segmentation loss showing up
to +2.6% improvement over the base case λseg = 0 which
is always the worst performer. We note that all models work
well for c23 compression and achieve state of the art results
(highlighted numbers) for Face2Face and FaceSwap using a
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TABLE III
BINARY SEGMENTATION ACCURACY - (TOP) MANIPULATION
METHOD-SPECIFIC TRAINING, (BOTTOM) TRAINING WITH ALL
MANIPULATION METHODS
C23 Compression C40 Compression
λseg DF F2F FS DF F2F FS
0.2 87.54 84.34 84.26 80.20 69.92 74.66
0.3 89.28 85.45 85.37 80.39 71.36 74.70
0.4 89.24 85.32 86.34 80.99 70.29 75.84
0.5 88.43 85.60 86.19 81.34 71.53 75.94
0.6 88.23 85.68 86.43 81.23 73.11 76.35
0.7 88.58 85.22 86.22 81.04 73.48 76.39
1.0 89.62 86.38 86.80 81.85 74.35 77.43
0.2 79.87 78.78 77.95 73.63 73.81 72.91
0.3 81.06 81.35 79.05 74.39 74.23 73.17
0.4 81.54 80.73 77.99 74.05 74.35 73.78
0.5 81.36 81.28 78.76 74.33 74.83 73.86
0.6 82.03 81.86 79.25 75.30 74.70 74.25
0.7 82.37 82.43 79.04 74.55 75.17 74.07
1.0 84.22 82.93 81.52 77.07 75.79 74.85
Fig. 4. Precision-Recall curves for models trained with λseg = 1.0
individually trained for each manipulation method
significantly smaller network (∼ 1.2M trainable parameters)
than [34] (∼ 22M parameters). For higher compression we
note a significant performance deterioration for all models.
In every case performance drops when the training set
includes samples from all manipulation methods as opposed
to method-specific training.
Segmentation accuracies (per pixel classification) are
shown in Table III. There apart from results shown for
TABLE IV
BINARY CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY
C23 Compression C40 Compression
λseg PGAN STYLEGAN PGAN STYLEGAN
0.0 99.96 99.55 99.76 97.66
0.2 99.97 99.55 99.77 97.59
0.3 99.98 99.59 99.81 97.60
0.4 99.96 99.55 99.73 97.32
0.5 99.94 99.52 99.78 97.28
0.6 99.97 99.56 99.74 97.43
0.7 99.94 99.50 99.74 97.27
0.0 99.66 99.23 97.31 95.04
0.2 99.62 99.32 97.21 94.78
0.3 99.63 99.31 97.33 94.89
0.4 99.65 99.32 97.02 94.94
0.5 99.53 99.33 97.17 94.75
0.6 99.61 99.20 96.99 94.84
0.7 99.65 99.24 97.03 94.89
λseg = 1.0 all other models were selected on the basis
of best classification accuracy on the evaluation set. Given
the additional selection bias for segmentation only trained
models, it is no surprise that they outperform all other
models, however, it must be noted in most cases best
classification performance corresponded to the best choice
for the segmentation task as well. Precision-Recall curves
for models trained individually can be seen in Fig.4. Some
examples of predicted segmentation masks from the test set
can be seen in Fig.5, 6 for medium and high compression
respectively. In many cases we note that the model is missing
part of the chin area which is due to the extraction process
defined in section IV-A.
B. Image Generation Detection
Per class classification accuracies for the generated image
detection task can be seen in Table IV. The trained networks
perform better here, showing this to be an easier task than
detecting manipulated images. We notice that the model
performs worse for the more realistic StyleGan images, the
difference from PGAN being especially pronounced for the
C40 compressed images and a drop in accuracy when the
training set is composed of samples from both methods.
Including segmentation loss here does not found to improve
results as there is no noticeable jump in performance when
it is introduced as was the case for manipulated images.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
In this paper we proposed a simple FCN architecture
designed to exploit local patterns found in manipulated
images. The same architecture is further trained and tested
on a set of images extracted from GANs trained on human
faces which proved to be an easier task for the models.
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Fig. 5. Image Segmentation results for C23 compression. Top Left: Deepfakes, Top Right: Face2Face, Bottom Left: FaceSwap, Bottom Right: Pristine.
Fig. 6. Image Segmentation results for C40 compression. Top Left: Deepfakes, Top Right: Face2Face, Bottom Left: FaceSwap, Bottom Right: Pristine.
In each of image pairs, left image shows segmentation mask in white, right image shows predicted mask in red.
Additionally, we defined a process for joint classification-
segmentation training and shown that classification perfor-
mance can greatly benefit by including large contribution of
segmentation loss in the total objective function.
The trained models generally performed better for low com-
pression videos. As finding manipulations in highly com-
pressed images is likely to involve a large number of weak
patterns and multiple feature transformation steps we suggest
that deeper architectures should be more suitable for that
task. Since the methodology proposed here can be readily
applied with few alterations to training deeper architectures,
we suggest this line of research as part of a future project.
Moreover, since segmentation appears to be the more difficult
of the two tasks and to improve classification we believe
7
experimenting with more architectures specific to image
segmentation to lead to improved results.
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